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THE DECKER FORESTRY POLLUTION 
CASE: CONSTITUTIONAL RISKS WHEN 
COURTS USE AUER DEFERENCE TO 
BYPASS REGULATORY PROTECTIONS 
MICHAEL TIERNEY* 
Abstract: In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the Supreme 
Court upheld the EPA’s interpretation of the agency’s own regulation regarding 
exemption of channeled stormwater discharges from National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System permit requirements under the Clean Water Act. The 
Court deferred to the EPA’s interpretation under the Auer doctrine, which dictates 
that an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to 
deference unless the interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation. This Comment argues that Auer deference violates foundational sepa-
ration of powers principles by allowing a governmental agency to both write and 
interpret the law. This power is inherently dangerous, and the ease with which it 
can be abused and manipulated does not bode well for the environment. Although 
administrative agencies possess specialized knowledge that can inform their de-
cisionmaking, this knowledge should not give agencies a license to flaunt consti-
tutional safeguards in the name of efficiency. The Supreme Court should have 
reached an opposite conclusion in Decker and should have used the case as an 
opportunity to overrule Auer because agencies should not be able to write and in-
terpret the law simultaneously. 
INTRODUCTION 
The federally protected forests of the United States are a precious re-
source that provide timber for lumber and paper production, a habitat for na-
tive wildlife, and recreation areas for seasonal tourists.1 Each of these capaci-
ties, however, is in potential conflict and requires a delicate balance of meth-
ods to control, cultivate, and preserve this diverse functionality.2 A highly 
technical task such as this, though, is unsuited for the average forest enthusi-
                                                                                                                           
 * Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2013–2014. 
 1 Thomas Lundmark, Methods of Forest Law-Making, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 783, 783 
(1995). 
 2 See id.; Lawrence Lee Budner, Note, Is a Logging Road’s Collected Runoff Exempt from 
NPDES Permitting?—Rethinking The EPA’s “Silvicultural Rule,” 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 197, 
197 (2013) (“Forestland is the site of a theatre of conflicting human activities, some beneficial to for-
est ecosystems and others threatening.”). 
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ast.3 These concerns are therefore delegated to the more technically informed 
federal administrative agencies, which are in a better position to manage these 
complicated matters.4 
The central question is whether these agencies always act in the best in-
terests of whatever they oversee.5 If agencies do not act this way, the question 
becomes whether there is a way to challenge a particular agency decision such 
that a “second opinion” from the judicial branch may be warranted.6 As this 
Comment discusses, the answer in a very important aspect is largely no.7 
The U.S. Forest Service (USFS) is tasked with protecting the health, di-
versity, and productivity of the nation’s forests.8 To aid itself in carrying out 
this responsibility, the USFS contracts with a number of private entities that 
engage in practices purportedly aimed at sustaining the nation’s forests.9 Many 
of these aims, the USFS claims, are met through the rather simple acts of forest 
thinning and removal of dead wood.10 This in turn gives rise to an opportunity 
for private, for-profit timber companies to become involved in the ecological 
preservation initiative.11 
Historically, most of the nation’s logging industry has been situated in the 
Pacific Northwest.12 To gain access to the forests, timber companies build and 
maintain logging roads.13 These roads are contractually specified routes that 
run parallel to, or very near, riparian ecosystems.14 Because rainwater is plenti-
ful along the coast of the Pacific Northwest, the logging industry must adapt to 
                                                                                                                           
 3 ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SO-
CIETY 218 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2010). 
 4 Id. 
 5 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) (asking the ques-
tion quis custodiet ipsos custodes—“Who will mind the minders themselves?” —when society dele-
gates administrative powers to the government). 
 6 See id. 
 7 See infra notes 98–126 and accompanying text. 
 8 Strategic Planning and Resource Assessment, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, http://www.fs.fed.us/plan/ 
(last modified Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://perma.cc/89W9-HTQ9. 
 9 See U.S. FOREST SERV., WATER QUALITY AND WETLANDS 3 (undated), available at http://nrs.
fs.fed.us/fmg/nfmg/docs/mn/WaterQ.pdf and http://perma.cc/RQ35-GFU2. 
 10 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HEALTHY FORESTS: AN INITIATIVE FOR WILDFIRE PREVEN-
TION AND STRONGER COMMUNITIES 3 (2002), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/projects/documents/
HealthyForests_Pres_Policy%20A6_v2.pdf and http://perma.cc/D3MC-KJ43; see also Eric E. Huber, 
Environmental Litigation and the Healthy Forests Initiative, 29 VT. L. REV. 797, 800 (2005). 
 11 Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. Brown, 640 F.3d 1063, 1066–68 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 12 Seeing the Forest for the Trees: Placing Washington's Forests in Historical Context, CTR. FOR 
THE STUDY OF THE PAC. NW., https://www.washington.edu/uwired/outreach/cspn/Website/Classroom
%20Materials/Curriculum%20Packets/Evergreen%20State/Section%20II.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2014), 
available at http://perma.cc/GDC6-KNB6. 
 13 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067. 
 14 Id. 
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obstacles imposed by the specific environment.15 In parts of Oregon, as much 
as 200 inches of precipitation can fall annually.16 Logging roads are therefore 
designed with “systems of ditches, culverts, and channels that collect and con-
vey” rainwater (called “stormwater discharge” or “runoff”) away from the 
roads and into the adjacent rivers and streams.17 
Although the roads remain navigable, these systems often result in an un-
intended consequence: Stormwater discharge containing a large amount of sed-
iment pollution18 flows from the roads into the waterways, which devastates 
aquatic wildlife and the rivers’ life-sustaining resources.19 
It seems intuitive that the Clean Water Act (CWA or “the Act”), which 
Congress passed to eliminate the discharge of pollutants and “restore and 
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s wa-
ters,” should regulate these stormwater discharges.20 Due to the way that the 
EPA, in partnership with the USFS and private timber companies, has defined 
and categorized these stormwater discharges, however, such discharges have 
been held outside the scope of CWA regulation.21 Moreover, this exemption is 
seemingly beyond meaningful judicial review.22 
When an administrative agency interprets its own promulgated regulation, 
the agency is believed to “speak[] as the legislature, and its pronouncement has 
the force of a statute.”23 For this reason, an agency’s interpretation, no matter 
how controversial, receives judicial deference under the doctrine announced in 
Auer v. Robbins.24 In effect, “Auer deference,” as it has come to be known, 
enables an agency to write and interpret the law simultaneously, which is a 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1333 (2013); About Pacific Northwest 
Climate, CLIMATE IMPACTS GRP., http://cses.washington.edu/cig/pnwc/pnwc.shtml (last visited Nov. 
12, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/HS87-7BX3. 
 16 Climate of Oregon, W. REG’L CLIMATE CTR., http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/narratives/oregon/ (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2013), available at http://perma.cc/8CW9-FJBY. 
 17 See Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067. 
 18 This pollution is made up of small rocks, sand, and dirt. Id. 
 19 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333; Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067; THOMAS C. BROWN & DAN BIN-
KLEY, EFFECTS OF MANAGEMENT ON WATER QUALITY IN NORTH AMERICAN FORESTS 14 (1991), 
available at http://www.fs.fed.us/rm/value/docs/management_effects_forest_water_quality.pdf and http://
perma.cc/4MCN-T3Y3. 
 20 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). 
 21 This practice dates back to 1973, when the EPA promulgated a series of regulations exempting 
several kinds of discharges from NPDES. See 40 C.F.R. § 125.4(j) (1975). The CWA delegates broad 
authority to the EPA to fill in the gaps and carry out the principle aims of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1251(d). 
 22 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337. 
 23 See Ariz. Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 386 (1932). 
 24 Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct 871, 880 (2011) (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 
U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). Auer deference is also sometimes called Seminole Rock deference, though the 
two are legally identical. Compare Auer, 519 U.S. at 461, with Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
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power that potentially frustrates traditional democratic safeguards and the un-
derlying constitutional framework.25 
In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the Supreme 
Court had an opportunity to revisit the rules of binding agency deference, spe-
cifically in connection with these unregulated stormwater discharges.26 With a 
7-1 majority (Justice Breyer did not participate),27 the Court ruled overwhelm-
ingly in favor of deferring to the EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation, and 
the Court expressly affirmed both the Auer doctrine and the EPA’s ability to 
exempt these destructive discharges from CWA regulation. 
A concurrence by Chief Justice Roberts, however, opened the door to fu-
ture challenges.28 Chief Justice Roberts noted that “serious questions” had 
been raised about the correctness of Auer that “go[] to the heart of administra-
tive law.”29 With Decker as a textbook example, this Comment argues that Au-
er deference, the precedent that ultimately produced the majority decision in 
Decker, violates foundational separation of powers principles by allowing a 
governmental agency that has promulgated a regulation great flexibility in sub-
sequently interpreting and re-interpreting that law.30 Not only is this situation 
inherently dangerous, but the ease with which this power can be abused does 
not bode well for environment.31 Although administrative agencies possess a 
significant amount of specialized knowledge that can inform their deci-
sionmaking, this knowledge should not allow them to flaunt constitutional 
safeguards in the name of efficiency.32 The Supreme Court should have 
reached an opposite conclusion in Decker and should have used Decker as an 
opportunity to overrule Auer, because agencies should not be able to write and 
interpret the law simultaneously.33 Problematic constitutional issues arise 
when courts subsequently grant excessive deference to an agency interpret-
                                                                                                                           
 25 See John Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations 
of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 618 (1996) (arguing that Seminole Rock leaves an agency 
free to write a law and then “say what the law is” through its authoritative interpretation of its own 
regulations); Noah Hall, Deferring to EPA’s Interpretation of Its Own Rules, Supreme Court Holds 
That Logging Road Runoff Pollution Is Exempt from Clean Water Act Regulation, GREAT LAKES L. 
(Aug. 31, 2013), http://www.greatlakeslaw.org/blog/2013/03/deferring-to-epas-interpretation-of-its-
own-rules-supreme-court-holds-that-logging-road-runoff-pollu.html, available at http://perma.cc/V9C5-
A4ZC (asserting that Auer deference allows an agency to make and interpret the law without public 
participation or meaningful judicial review). 
 26 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1337–38. 
 27 Id. at 1338. 
 28 See id. at 1338–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 29 Id. 
 30 See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text. 
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ing—and re-interpreting—regulations that the agency may have issued many 
years, and different Administrations, in the past.34  
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In Decker, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether discharges of 
channeled stormwater runoff flowing from two logging roads in Oregon’s 
Tillamook State Forest could be legally exempted from CWA regulation.35 The 
CWA requires a party to apply for and obtain National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES)36 permitting to legally discharge stormwater 
runoff that is “associated with industrial activity” through a “point source”37 
into the navigable waters of the United States.38 In September 2006, the 
Northwest Environmental Defense Center (NEDC) filed suit in the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the District of Oregon to challenge the EPA’s exemption of these 
destructive stormwater discharges.39 
According to NEDC, the discharged stormwater was unquestionably “as-
sociated with industrial activity” given the heavy machinery and large logging 
trucks that were essential in its creation.40 NEDC alleged that the large timber 
company Georgia-Pacific West, as well as certain government officials, had 
failed to obtain necessary NPDES permits to discharge the stormwater run-
off.41 NEDC claimed that the defendants had violated the law by failing to ob-
tain these permits.42 
The claimed “point sources” at issue (the logging ditches, culverts, and 
channels) are graded such that for most of their length, water runs off into the 
narrow ditches on the sides.43 At certain points, these ditches empty into 
“cross-drain” culverts, which pass below the roads and carry the runoff under-
ground until disposal.44 Where the roads pass near riparian systems, however, 
the discharge can be dumped wherever is convenient.45 
                                                                                                                           
34 See infra notes 98–127 and accompanying text. 
 35 133 S. Ct. at 1333. 
 36 NPDES is a permitting program whereby polluters must apply for and receive permits to make 
individual pollution discharges. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). NPDES functions as an exception to the 
general ban on pollutant discharges in the CWA. See id. § 1311(a). 
 37 The CWA defines “point source” as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, in-
cluding but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, 
rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which 
pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id. § 1362(14). 
 38 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333. 
 39 Id. 
 40 See id. at 1336. 
 41 Id. at 1333. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1067. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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NEDC claimed that the plain language of the Act and subsequent EPA 
regulations specify that channeled logging road runoff is a type of discharge 
requiring a NPDES permit.46 The EPA disagreed and contended that it had 
never interpreted logging road runoff as requiring NPDES permits.47 The EPA, 
citing its interpretations of the Silvicultural Rule, claimed that no permit was 
necessary because that agency read the rule to exempt logging road runoff as 
not “associated with industrial activity.”48 The district court agreed with the 
EPA, concluded that the ditches, culverts, and channels were not point sources, 
and ultimately dismissed the action.49 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit reversed.50 
The Ninth Circuit held that although the Silvicultural Rule was ambigu-
ous on whether the ditches, culverts, and channels at issue were point sources 
“associated with industrial activity,” they must be deemed as such to give 
meaning to the CWA’s broad definition of “point source.”51 The Ninth Circuit 
then held that because the Industrial Stormwater Rule,52 another regulation 
relevant to the case at bar, referenced a series of categories classifying firms by 
the different types of business activities in which they engage, the discharges 
at issue were inherently “associated with industrial activity” within the mean-
ing of the Industrial Stormwater Rule because of how the rule classified and 
discussed the logging and timber industries.53 The Industrial Stormwater Rule 
was held unambiguous on this point.54 Thus, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
discharges were from point sources and therefore not exempt from the NPDES 
permitting scheme.55 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and three days before oral argu-
ments, the EPA issued an amendment to the Industrial Stormwater Rule and 
attempted to distinguish, and therefore exempt, purely logging and tree-falling 
activities from CWA jurisdiction.56 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333; Brief for Law Professors as Amicus Curiae on the Propriety of 
Administrative Deference in Support of Respondent at 14–15, Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338 
and 11-347). 
 47 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331–32; Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11–12, 
Decker, 133 S. Ct. 1326 (Nos. 11-338 and 11-347). 
 48 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331–32. 
 49 Id. at 1333. 
 50 Brown, 640 F.3d at 1087. 
 51 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1333. 
 52 This rule is an EPA regulation defining which stormwater discharges are “associated with in-
dustrial activity.” See 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2013). 
 53 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1334. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. The Separation of Powers 
In the years leading up to the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, state 
governments behaved in ways that led many Americans to conclude that “we 
the people” were capable of the same tyranny and excess that inspired the 
Revolution.57 Thus, by 1787, not wanting to risk recreating the same system 
from which they had just achieved independence, Americans knew that if left 
unchecked, even representative government could result in tyranny concentrat-
ed in the national legislature.58 As James Madison wrote, “dependence on the 
people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has 
taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions.”59 To provide for these 
precautionary measures, the Constitution metes power in three largely inde-
pendent branches of government: the legislative, executive, and judicial de-
partments.60 
Consistent with these concerns, the Framers took special care to limit 
Congress’s absolute control over the legislative process by ensuring that each 
of the other two branches were provided with significant influence on how the 
Nation’s laws were enacted.61 For example, the Framers created the Presiden-
tial veto to override any potential excesses of Congress. Moreover, to protect 
the executive branch the Framers mandated that the electoral process be done 
by electors, rather than members of Congress.62 
The Framers limited the legislature’s influence on the judiciary by ensur-
ing that permanent federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behav-
ior, and shall receive . . . a Compensation which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.”63 This created an incentive for the judiciary to 
maintain a meaningful balance within the system so that Congress could not 
simply dominate the courts, a problem which had arisen in several in state 
                                                                                                                           
 57 See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM 143–83 (1985); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73, 74 (Max Farrand ed., 1966) (remarks of James Madison that 
“[e]xperience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power 
into its vortex”); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra, at 76 (Gouverneur 
Morris “concurred in thinking the public liberty in greater danger from Legislative usurpations than 
from any other source”); MANNING, supra note 25, at 640; THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that “legislative usurpations . . . by assembling all 
power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The accumulation of 
all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether . . . hereditary, self-
appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”). 
 58 See MANNING, supra note 25, at 640. 
 59 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 60 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1. 
 61 Id. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1; id. art. III, § 1. 
 62 See MANNING, supra note 25, at 640–42. 
 63 See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
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governments.64 In summary, these provisions ensured that power was not con-
solidated into one branch of government.65 
Finally, within the legislature itself, bicameralism and presentment are the 
chief safeguards of liberty because each inherently protects the deliberative 
process.66 Bicameralism and presentment force the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives to act together, promote caution and deliberation, and at times 
produce “conflicts, confusion, and discordance” to “assure full, vigorous, and 
open debate on the great issues affecting the people.”67 
The aims of the constitutional framework are to foster deliberation and 
ensure meaningful checks and balances within the overall system, and these 
same strictures equally animate the behavior of government agencies.68 
B. The Clean Water Act and Implementing Regulations 
In 1948, Congress passed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWP-
CA) to establish a national framework to regulate water pollution.69 In 1977, 
Congress significantly amended the FWPCA and renamed it the Clean Water 
Act (CWA), to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation’s waters.”70 These amendments established new tech-
nology-based effluent limits and delegated to the EPA the authority to promul-
gate and enforce effluent regulations consistent with the purposes of the 
CWA.71 
Subject to express limited exceptions, § 301(a) of the CWA states that 
“the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”72 Reinforcing 
this point, the congressional record indicates that the CWA was to be much 
stronger than the previous version of the program under the FWPCA: a Senate 
report states that § 301 “clearly establishes that the discharge of pollutants is 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See id.; see also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 961–62 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the Constitution’s separation of powers was intended to prevent “the exercise of judicial power” 
by the legislative branch). 
 65 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 961–62 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 66 See MANNING, supra note 25, at 649. 
 67 See id.; see also Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986). 
 68 See MANNING, supra note 25, at 654. 
 69 Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-845, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as 
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2006)). 
 70 Clean Water Act of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1357 (2006). 
 71 Id. §§ 1251(d), 1311; see Natural Res. Def. Council v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1371–72 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (summarizing the statutory goals of the FWPCA and CWA amendments). 
 72 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The CWA defines the “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source [or] . . . any addition of any pollutant to the waters 
of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point source other than a vessel or floating craft.” Id. 
§ 1362(12); see also Budner, supra note 2, at 202. 
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unlawful.”73 Acting as a fundamental exception to § 301’s pollution discharge 
prohibition, however, the CWA allows individuals, corporations, and govern-
ments seeking to discharge pollution “associated with industrial activity” 
through a “point source” to do so only if they secure a NPDES permit.74 
When the CWA took effect, the EPA struggled to process many permit 
applications from a large number of owners and operators of statutorily-
defined point sources throughout the country that were required to register 
their discharges.75 To ease this burden, the EPA issued new regulations carving 
out exceptions from the NPDES permitting scheme.76 In 1977, however, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that these exempting regula-
tions were beyond the scope of authority delegated by the Act and forced the 
agency back to the drafting table.77 The EPA then issued new regulations to 
better define which categories of discharges actually qualified as point sources 
from the outset.78  
The timber and logging industries were among those businesses targeted 
by the new categories, the so-called Silvicultural Rule spelling out that a “Sil-
vicultural point source [is] any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance 
related to rock crushing, gravel washing, log sorting, or log storage facilities 
which are operated in connection with silvicultural activities and from which 
pollutants are discharged into waters of the United States.”79 The rule further 
states that “[t]he term [silvicultural point source] does not include non-point 
source silvicultural activities such as nursery operations, site preparation, re-
forestation and subsequent cultural treatment, thinning, prescribed burning, 
pest and fire control, harvesting operations, surface drainage, or road construc-
tion and maintenance from where there is natural runoff.”80 
In 1987, to ease the permitting burden further for the EPA, Congress 
adopted stormwater-related amendments to the CWA.81 These amendments 
exempted most “discharges composed entirely of stormwater” from the 
NPDES permitting scheme, but still required permits for stormwater discharg-
es “associated with industrial activity.”82 The statute did not define “industrial 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 42 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3709. The FWP-
CA provided a less comprehensive discharge policy allowing for a certain level of pollutant disposal, 
but the aim of § 301 of the CWA, according to the Senate Report, is to underscore the idea that “no 
one has the right to pollute.” Id. 
 74 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1330 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B)). 
 75 Id. at 1331 (noting the difficulties that the EPA faced regarding the new permitting responsibil-
ities); see also Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372–73. 
 76 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331. 
 77 Costle, 568 F.2d at 1377. 
 78 Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1331. 
 79 40 C.F.R. § 122.27(b)(1) (2013). 
 80 Id. (emphasis added). 
 81 Decker, 133 S.Ct at 1331–32. 
 82 Id. at 1332 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006)) (emphasis added). 
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activity,” and the EPA, quick to seize upon this purported ambiguity, adopted a 
new regulation known as the Industrial Stormwater Rule.83 The Rule specified 
discharges “associated with industrial activity” as “the discharge from any 
conveyance that is used for collecting and conveying stormwater and that is 
directly related to manufacturing, processing, or raw materials storage areas at 
an industrial plant.”84 
Importantly, the rule further specified that “[f]or the categories or indus-
tries identified in this section, the term includes, but is not limited to, storm 
water discharge from . . . immediate access roads and rail lines used or trav-
eled by carriers of raw materials, manufactured products, waste materials, or 
by-products used or created by the facility . . . .”85 Three days before the Su-
preme Court was to hear oral arguments in Decker v. Northwest Environmental 
Defense Center, the EPA issued its final version of an amendment to the Indus-
trial Stormwater Rule that attempted to distinguish, and therefore exempt, 
purely logging and tree falling activities.86 
C. Auer Deference 
The judicial principle known as Auer deference influences the Supreme 
Court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations “unless [that] 
interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”87 In 
Auer v. Robbins, a lieutenant and several police sergeants sued their respective 
commissioners for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
(FLSA).88 The commissioners argued that the sergeants were “bona fide execu-
tive, administrative, or professional” employees as defined in the FLSA and 
therefore exempted from these overtime pay requirements.89 Under regulations 
set by the Secretary of Labor, the overtime pay exemption applied to employ-
ees paid on a minimum “salary basis” and required that their compensation not 
be reduced due to potential changes in the “quality or quantity of the work per-
formed.”90 The officers claimed that they did not satisfy this standard because, 
under the terms in the police manual, their pay could theoretically be reduced 
as a disciplinary infraction.91 In a unanimous decision written by Justice Scal-
ia, the Supreme Court agreed with the district court and the U.S. Court of Ap-
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peals for the Eighth Circuit, and found that the sergeants and lieutenant did not 
qualify for overtime pay.92 Because “the salary-basis test [was] a creature of 
the Secretary’s own regulations,” his interpretation of it “[was], under [the 
Court’s] jurisprudence, controlling unless plainly erroneous or inconsistent 
with the regulation.”93 
Auer deference is founded, purportedly, on one of two articulated assump-
tions.94 The first is that, as the drafter of a certain regulation, an agency will 
have special insight into its proper implementation and enforcement.95 An 
agency is therefore accorded deference on this premise.96 The second assump-
tion is that an agency possesses special expertise in administering its complex 
and highly technical regulatory program.97 Although Auer deference has gov-
erned judicial review of this form of regulatory interpretation, several Supreme 
Court justices have raised questions about the wisdom of continuing to apply 
this deferential standard.98 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Decker v. Northwest Environmental Defense Center, the Supreme 
Court held that the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its implementing regulations 
do not require NPDES permits before channeled stormwater runoff from log-
ging roads can be discharged into the navigable waters of the United States.99 
The Court reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and ruled 
in favor of deferring to the EPA’s interpretation of its own regulation.100   
Judicial deference based on the Court’s holding in Auer v. Robbins allows 
an administrative agency both to write and interpret the law.101 Although Auer 
deference can promote judicial economy, it also enables the federal govern-
ment to do precisely what the Framers strived to keep it from doing: consoli-
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dating all the power of the government into one of its branches.102 Ever since 
Marbury v. Madison, it has been “emphatically the province and duty of the 
Judicial Department to say what the law is,” but the Auer doctrine, by dictating 
that a reviewing court must usually defer to an agency’s own interpretation of 
its regulation, essentially frustrates this duty.103 Moreover, this deferential 
principle is dangerous because it allows an administrative agency to say what 
the law is, even though Congress might have intended otherwise.104  
This danger was on display during the course of the Decker.105 The Su-
preme Court should have reached an opposite conclusion in Decker and should 
have used Decker as an opportunity to overrule Auer, because agencies should 
not be able to write and interpret the law simultaneously.106 Although adminis-
trative agencies possess a significant amount of specialized knowledge that can 
inform their decisionmaking, this knowledge should not allow agencies to 
flaunt constitutional safeguards.107 
For example, the CWA expressly prohibits the discharge of pollution 
through a point source into the navigable waters of the United States without a 
NPDES permit.108 The statue is also relatively clear: A point source generally 
encapsulates “[a]ny discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including 
but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, [or] conduit.”109 According 
to the most basic application of this definition, it would seem that the storm-
water discharges in Decker fall within the definition’s purview: The storm-
water was channeled through human-made pipes and ditches, carrying with it 
human-made pollutants from human-made forest roads.110 Relying on the Sil-
vicultural Rule’s exception of “natural runoff,” however, the EPA exempted the 
stormwater discharges in Decker because it defined these discharges as “natu-
ral.”111  
These “natural” discharges contain massive amounts of human-made sed-
iment pollution, namely pulverized gravel, rocks, and woodchips. Thus, such 
pollution is anything but “natural” and should be regulated as the CWA pro-
vides.112 Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority that “[i]t is well established 
that an agency’s interpretation need not be the only possible reading of a regu-
                                                                                                                           
 102 See MANNING, supra note 25, at 639–41. 
 103 See 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 104 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 105 See id. at 1337 (majority opinion). 
 106 See id. at 1341 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 107 See id. 
 108 Id. at 1337  (majority opinion) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(B) (2006)). 
 109 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). 
 110 See Decker, 133 S. Ct. at 1342–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 111 See id. at 1332–33 (majority opinion). 
 112 See id. at 1343 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
116 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 41 E. Supp.:104 
lation—or even the best one—to prevail.”113 In summary, the EPA interpreted 
the law to say something contrary to what the law’s natural language denoted, 
and because EPA made this determination, the Supreme Court, following Auer, 
held that the EPA’s reading prevailed.114 
Another example of Auer deference eliding traditional democratic safe-
guards relates to the definition of “industrial activity”: By virtue of the 1987 
amendments to the CWA, point sources composed entirely of stormwater are 
exempted from the NPDES permitting scheme.115 Stormwater discharges “as-
sociated with industrial activity,” however, are still subject to NPDES permit-
ting.116 With the Industrial Stormwater Rule, the EPA attempted to define what 
“associated with industrial activity” meant.117 The agency claimed that through 
its published definition, logging is generally exempted from NPDES regula-
tion.118 As Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Decker, however, the regula-
tion sets out eleven “categories of industries,” and regarding those industries, 
discharges are “industrial” if they come from sites used for the “transportation” 
of “any raw material.”119  
Logging roads are used primarily to gain access to and remove timber from 
the forest.120 Furthermore, the EPA has interpreted its regulation to indicated that 
timber cutting is exempted because it is not “directly related to manufacturing, 
processing or raw materials storage areas at an industrial plant.”121 One of the 
eleven categories of industry, however, is “[f]acilities classified as Standard In-
dustrial Classifications 24 (except 2434).” Standard Industrial Classification 24 
in turn provides at the top, “Logging” —defined as “[e]stablishments primarily 
engaged in cutting timber.”122 Again, essentially because the EPA stated other-
wise, despite the plain language of the EPA’s own regulatory scheme the Court 
held that NPDES permits are not required for channeled stormwater discharges 
because the logging industry is not an industrial activity.123 
When an agency promulgates a regulation, the agency should be required 
to abide by what the plain language of the regulation actually says.124 If the 
agency wishes the regulation to say otherwise, it could alter the regulation 
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through the rulemaking process.125 A government agency should not be able to 
write a law one way and interpret it in another way.126 The danger of this pos-
sibility is exacerbated by the principle of Auer deference, which limits the abil-
ity of courts to stop such abuse within the system.127 As Montesquieu ex-
plained, “[w]hen legislative power is united with executive power in a single 
person or in a single body of the magistracy, there is no liberty, because one 
can fear that the same monarch or senate that makes tyrannical laws will exe-
cute them tyrannically.”128 
CONCLUSION 
Through Auer deference, a federal agency essentially has the power both 
to write and interpret the law. Although administrative agencies possess a sig-
nificant amount of specialized knowledge that can enhance their decisionmak-
ing, this knowledge should not provide agencies with a license to flaunt consti-
tutional safeguards. The Supreme Court in Decker v. Northwest Environmental 
Defense Center reversed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and 
deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of its own stormwater discharge regula-
tions, but the Court should have reached an opposite conclusion and should 
have overruled Auer v. Robbins. Agencies should not be able to write and in-
terpret the law simultaneously. Congress sought to protect the integrity of the 
nation’s waters through the Clean Water Act, one of the most important pieces 
of environmental legislation. As Decker illustrates, an administrative agency, 
through manipulation of language and purported ambiguities in its own regula-
tions, can flout and recraft the law without meaningful judicial review. 
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